(EDITORIAL from Korea Herald on Nov. 13)

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Flawed academy merger

Korea must reconsider politically driven plans to restructure its military academies

Military academies take generations to build their reputations, yet a government can unsettle them in months. Few institutions are less suited to political experimentation than those preparing the nation's military commanders.

South Korea's latest attempt to overhaul officer education illustrates the consequences of reform without a coherent strategic purpose. The Lee Jae Myung administration's original plan to merge the Army, Navy and Air Force academies into one institution in Daejeon has given way to a patchwork arrangement that raises more questions than it answers.

Under the revised proposal, the Naval Academy in Jinhae, South Gyeongsang Province, and the Air Force Academy in Cheongju, North Chungcheong Province, would remain in place, while the Korea Military Academy would relocate from Seoul to Sejong. A smaller joint academy would be established at the Jaundae military complex in Daejeon.

One proposed curriculum would have cadets spend their first and fourth years receiving joint instruction and the intervening two years at their respective service academies.

The change reflects a retreat from the initial plan after objections to training naval cadets far from the sea and air force cadets without runways. Yet retaining the existing schools while adding another institution and moving cadets between campuses could raise costs and disrupt educational continuity.

The revised arrangement also weakens the rationale for a separate joint academy. If most of the four-year education remains under existing institutions, the government must explain what additional capabilities the new structure would deliver and why cooperation among the academies could not develop them.

The political backdrop is troubling. In August, President Lee Jae Myung questioned why KMA graduates had escaped accountability for past military coups. His remarks reinforced suspicions that the merger was partly intended to weaken the Army's institutional influence following the Dec. 3, 2024, martial law crisis.

Those responsible for unconstitutional actions must answer for their conduct, but an entire educational institution should not become a target of political retribution. Restructuring one branch as a form of political discipline can alienate career officers and undermine the military's nonpartisan identity.

There is a legitimate case for stronger joint operations. Modern warfare spans land, sea and air, as well as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic domain. Future officers need a broader understanding of integrated operations.

But joint competence rests on deep service-specific expertise, which administrative consolidation cannot manufacture. Officers must first master their own branches before coordinating effectively with others.

The practices of major military powers offer a useful reference. The US, Britain and France retain separate service academies, developing cooperation through professional education, staff colleges and joint exercises after commissioning. Their experience suggests that the substance of joint training matters more than the physical consolidation of educational institutions.

The proposed overhaul also overlooks the larger officer-training system. The Reserve Officers' Training Corps and university-based commissioning programs produce the majority of the country's junior officers. Reform confined to service academies would leave many of the officer corps outside its scope.

Resources earmarked for campus relocation and a new institution would be better spent updating curricula across all commissioning programs. Artificial intelligence, uncrewed systems and cognitive warfare deserve greater attention in preparing officers for future environments. Modernization must reach the entire officer corps, not just a limited cohort of cadets.

The government should scrutinize the current merger plan and consider retaining the three academies at their existing locations while reviewing officer education from the ground up.

An academy's worth lies in the quality of the commanders it produces, not in the administrative structure imposed upon it. Korea needs officers prepared for future battlefields, with their education guided by military requirements rather than political disputes.

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